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| A group of Rohingya refugee people walk in the water after crossing the Bangladesh-Myanmar border in Teknaf. |
Additional factors, imperatives and imponderables
Militarisation of almost all communities in Rakhine and its neighbouring Chin state is a reality now and may be a source of instability in Mizoram, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts and even some areas of Chittagong. Reemergence of ethnic conflicts in Manipur and Nagaland in the recent years points to Indian dilemma in handling the Kukis in the frontier areas and her nervousness to Chinese claim on parts of the Arunachal Pradesh. Meanwhile, the USA has signaled its keen interest in Burmese people’s struggle for democracy, freedom, human rights and justice trough incorporation of the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act (Burma Act) in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2023.
The Act in a way acknowledges Myanmar as a prime national security subject for the US. It accords the US Administration the discretionary authority to decide whether to take active role and thus reflects a much stronger resolve on part of US to get involved in matters related to Myanmar to facilitate establishment of a democratic government in Myanmar.
The multiplicity of actors and their varied interests make things totally unpredictable in the areas bordering Bangladesh, Myanmar, India and China. Hence, any misadventure to get militarily involved (the so-called plan B) will be extremely unpredictable and might lead to regional instability, involving players with geo-strategic interests. One cannot rule out Bangladesh being sucked into a vortex of armed conflict and it may even face new kinds of militancy in retaliation. Myanmar has the connections for stoking insurgent feelings in some ethnic communities with similarity to the Kukis and the communities with Myanmarese lineage inside Bangladesh.
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